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Abstract. Methods and insights from statistical physics are finding an increasing variety of applications
where one seeks to understand the emergent properties of a complex interacting system. One such area
concerns the dynamics of language at a variety of levels of description, from the behaviour of individual
agents learning simple artificial languages from each other, up to changes in the structure of languages
shared by large groups of speakers over historical timescales. In this Colloquium, we survey a hierarchy
of scales at which language and linguistic behaviour can be described, along with the main progress in
understanding that has been made at each of them—much of which has come from the statistical physics
community. We argue that future developments may arise by linking the different levels of the hierarchy
together in a more coherent fashion, in particular where this allows more effective use of rich empirical
data sets.
PACS. 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 02.50.Ey Stochastic processes – 87.19.lv Learning and
memory
1 Introduction
In 1972, Anderson famously articulated the idea that
“more is different” [1]: that the emergent consequence of
fundamental physical laws at one scale lead to new physi-
cal laws at a larger scale, and ones that are to be regarded
as fundamental as those that apply at the smaller scale. In
physics, statistical mechanics provides the conceptual and
methodological framework to build the bridge between the
dynamics at the larger scale and the interactions between
the constituents at the smaller scale.
A good illustration of this procedure is provided by the
two steps of coarse-graining that sit between the classical
Hamiltonian dynamics of point particles and the Navier-
Stokes equations for fluids. The first step is to shift from a
description in terms of individual particles to one in terms
of classes of particles, for example, all those at a similar
point in space and with a similar velocity (see e.g. [2]).
This trick, pioneered by Maxwell to determine the equi-
librium distribution of particle velocities [3], reduces the
dimensionality of the problem by a factor of N , the num-
ber of particles in the system. Since N is extremely large
(order 1023 or more) for macroscopic systems, this is an
impressive reduction in complexity. However it comes at
a cost: the full dynamics take the form of an infinite hi-
erarchy of equations, each of which requires a solution for
all of the others in order to be solved. To break this vi-
cious circle, a physical insight is needed. Specifically, the
molecular chaos assumption (employed by both Maxwell
[3] and Boltzmann [4] with varying degrees of explicitness)
amounts to a statement that the details of collisions be-
tween particles is less important than their overall effect,
which is taken to eliminate correlations between pairs of
particles. The Boltzmann equation that results is a non-
linear equation that describes the population dynamics of
particles and their movements between different classes.
A further step of averaging yields coarse-grained density
and velocity fields. Again, this step generates a hierar-
chy of equations which can be truncated by appealing to
a physical insight, namely that the macroscopic fields of
interest vary slowly on the length- and timescales of the
microscopic particle dynamics [5]. We thus arrive at the
Navier-Stokes equation, which is highly non-linear and can
describe extremely rich physical states, such as turbulence,
whose existence is unimaginable in the original Hamilto-
nian formulation.
The fact that Hamiltonian equations of motion lie at
the bottom of this hierarchy is incidental to the statistical
mechanical coarse-graining procedure. The crucial com-
ponent is the physical insight that allows certain aspects
of the dynamics at one level of the hierarchy to be re-
placed with an effective description that makes progress
towards understanding the next level possible. There is no
reason that such insights should be the preserve of con-
densed matter physics. Indeed, Anderson’s hierarchy ex-
tended from particle physics to the social sciences, pass-
ing through cell biology and psychology on the way. It
should therefore come as no surprise—nor concern—that
the reach of statistical physics has profitably expanded
into the biological [6,7] and sociological [8] domains. Fur-
thermore, in line with Anderson’s position, exploring these
applications areas often raises new fundamental questions
in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics.
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One area that has received growing attention from sta-
tistical physicists over the past fifteen years or so is the
quest for a quantitative understanding of language dy-
namics. Human language exhibits complexity at multiple
scales in at least two dimensions. First, language itself ex-
hibits complex structure at the level of sounds, words and
sentences through phonology (which specifies how sounds
may be be combined), morphology (how meaningful com-
binations of sounds may be further combined to make
words) and syntax (how sentences are formed) [9]. At each
level, the specific set of valid combinations varies from one
language to the next: for example, the order with which
words with a specific function appear in a sentence is not
the same in every language (as we will discuss further
in Section 2 below). At the same time, variation is not
completely arbitrary: for example, some word orders are
more common across the world’s languages than others.
Meanwhile, each language changes over time at all levels of
organisation, leading on occasion to predictable phenom-
ena like vowel shifts [10] and the unidirectional charac-
ter of grammaticalisation [11], whereby words with more
concrete meanings (like objects and actions, represented
by nouns and verbs) take on more abstract grammatical
functions (like relationships between objects, represented
by prepositions) over time, whilst the reverse process is
extremely rare [12].
It is natural to assume that the process of language
change is related to the variation that is observed be-
tween human languages. This leads to the second dimen-
sion of linguistic complexity, in that a language is a col-
lective phenomenon, shared by a group of speakers, and
that originates from interactions between individual mem-
bers of this group (whose membership may also change
over time). It is this dimension that has been of par-
ticular interest to statistical physicists, since it concerns
the question of how the properties of the system at large
can be understood from the behaviour of the component
parts. The aim of this short Colloquium is to set out the
main levels in this second hierarchy, starting in Section 2
with language as a structured system characteristic of a
whole group of speakers, continuing with competition of
languages for speakers in Section 3, how shared systems of
conventions may emerge from interactions between speak-
ers in Section 4, before rounding off with a discussion of
important details of these interactions in Section 5. Since
the range of topics is wide, and space is short, my coverage
of each individual topic will be unashamedly broad-brush.
Nevertheless, this will be sufficient to identify gaps that
remain in our understanding of language dynamics and
possible directions for future research, and in particular
those where statistical physicists may contribute. Refer-
ences to more in-depth review articles are also included
by way of an entry point to the literature for readers who
seek the degree of depth that I have been unable to go
into here.
2 Variation in language structure
As noted above, languages vary in their structure at all
levels of organisation. A useful resource for studying sim-
ilarities and differences between languages is the World
Atlas of Language Structure (WALS [13]) which specifies
up to 192 features (for example, the size of the conso-
nant inventory or the number of genders) across over 1000
languages. This database reinforces the findings of typo-
logical research [14] that whilst considerable variation is
evident in the structure of different languages, this varia-
tion is not unconstrained. An illustrative example is basic
word order, which concerns the order that the subject (S),
object (O) and verb (V) appear in a sentence. Although
all six orderings would convey the same information, the
two patterns that have the subject in the first position
characterise around 90% of the languages in WALS. This
highly non-uniform distribution over the possible states of
a language is referred to as a typological universal. More
sophisticated universals also exist [14], in particular impli-
cational universals, whereby the presence of one structure
in a language tends to imply another structure: for exam-
ple, if adjectives precede nouns, it is very likely (around
90% probability) that demonstratives also precede nouns
[13].
At the largest length and timescales we can think of
each language as a single coherent unit, and defined in
terms of some set of F features. For simplicity, let each of
these features be discrete such that feature f takes one of
mf distinct values, denoted σf . For example, in the case of
basic word order, σf takes one of six values. At this level
of description, the state of a language is fully specified by
the vector σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σF ). The first type of typolog-
ical universal then corresponds a nonuniform distribution
over the set of possible states {σ}, while implicational uni-
versals correspond to correlations between components of
the vector σ. In this framework, one can postulate (at
least) two possible explanations for these typological uni-
versals. The first is that some states σ are more stable
than others: for example, languages that place the sub-
ject first are less likely to change than those that have
it in a different position. The second is to acknowledge
that (like species) languages may have common ancestors
(for example, French and Romanian are descendants of
Latin), and hence correlations between the states of dif-
ferent languages can be attributed to a common historical
period. The main method to discriminate such explana-
tions is phylogenetic analysis (see e.g. [15] for a review in
the context of cultural evolution).
The basic idea is to assume first of all that the his-
torical evolution of languages can be modelled as a tree
within which branches occur at points in time where an
ancestor language splits into two daughters—see Figure 1.
On top of this tree structure, a stochastic model for the
changes in state that occur is superimposed. A natural
choice is a time-homogeneous Poisson process wherein the
probability that a language in state σ changes to state σ′
in a time interval dt is
Pdt(σ
′|σ; t) = ω(σ′|σ)dt , (1)
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Fig. 1. A tree relating languages with different structures.
New languages are created when an ancestor splits into two
daughters. Changes in state occur at points in time marked
with a filled circle. This gives rise to a set of distinct languages,
σ1, . . . , σ9, at the present time that are all descended from the
common language σ0.
i.e., that the rate of change from one state to another
is constant in time across all branches of the tree. Sam-
pling from this distribution gives a set of points at which
changes in state occurred, shown as circles on the branches
in Figure 1. From the stochastic model for changes in
state, one can compute the likelihood of arriving at the
current distribution of languages (given a common an-
cestor and specific tree structure). Then, using Bayesian
statistics, one can infer a posterior distribution of the pa-
rameters in the model, which includes the tree structure
and the transition rates between language states. It is also
possible to incorporate further constraints where informa-
tion is known, for example, points in history where a lan-
guage split occurred.
Since sampling the full parameter space to obtain pos-
terior distributions is computationally demanding, it is
only recently that these methods have become widely-
used. Prior to this, other methods—such as maximum
parsimony methods—were used to infer the relationships
between different languages [16]. In this context, maxi-
mum parsimony corresponds to the sequence of events
with the smallest number of changes in state. Initial stud-
ies [16,17] focussed on the lexicon (i.e., the set of words
available to speakers to express meanings). The idea is
the closely-related languages have more words in common
than distantly-related languages. More formally, one can
define cognate sets that comprise words from different lan-
guages that are judged to have the same form for the same
meaning [9]. In this context, each feature f corresponds
to one of the cognate sets, and σf = 0 or 1 depending
on whether the language in question appears in cognate
set f . A change in state then corresponds to a language
entering or leaving a cognate set.
One obvious question is whether it is reasonable to
assume that relationships between languages form a tree-
like structure, as in Figure 1. Evidence in favour of this
assumption was provided by Gray et al [16]: the most
parsimonious tree was more consistent with an ‘express-
train’ hypothesis where languages were established during
a rapid process of colonisation of successive ‘stations’ in
the Pacific by Austronesian-speaking populations, as op-
posed to an ‘entangled bank’ hypothesis characterised by
a high degree of contact between the different languages.
This work thus opened the door to a wide range of
quantitative inferences about the history of languages.
Key findings include support for the theory that Indo-
European languages originated in Anatolia around 8,000–
9,500 years ago [17,18] and that inferences based on the
structure of the sound system, word order and other
grammatical features allows reconstruction to greater time
depths than is possible with the lexicon, and specifically
that Papuan languages diverged over 10,000 years ago [19].
These findings continue with a number of studies on the
rate of language change. The rate of lexical change has
been found to vary by up to two orders of magnitude, and
to be correlated with the frequency of word use [20] and
population size [21]. In both cases the data are suggestive
of a power-law dependence of the rate on the explanatory
variable. A power law relationship between the rate of verb
regularisation and verb frequency was also found from a
corpus of English texts [22]. Here, however, the statistical
physicist will likely be disappointed that the exponents
of the power laws relating the rate of language change
to the frequencies of different linguistic units are not the
same: this suggests that the underlying mechanisms gen-
erating these mechanisms may not be universal—at least
in a strict statistical physics sense.
Most relevant to questions about the origin of typolog-
ical universals, and in particular the question of whether
more common structures are also more stable, are two
studies of word-order universals [23,24]. Of these two stud-
ies, that of Maurits and Griffiths [24] is conceptually more
straightforward. Here, the authors find that despite SOV
word order being slightly more common than SVO order
in the contemporary distribution of languages (at 48% and
41% respectively [13]), the historical rates of change be-
tween the two orders are indistinguishable, suggesting that
they are in fact of equal stability. Dunn et al [23] mean-
while investigate the more subtle question of implicational
universals. Here, the hypothesis is that if the orders of two
word classes (say adjective-noun and demonstrative-noun)
are found to be correlated in the contemporary distribu-
tion, one would expect to see a similar correlation in the
historical rates of change of these two structures. Only
two of the correlations expected from the contemporary
distribution were observed in the historical dynamics of
more than one language family. Furthermore, most of the
dynamical correlations that were identified were present
in a single language family.
This latter result suggests that factors specific to indi-
vidual cultures contribute to the dynamics that give rise
to typological universals. However, at this level of de-
scription, it does not pinpoint what these factors might
be. Some clues are provided by investigations of corre-
lations between language structures and quantities that
vary between cultures: of these, two studies [25,26] have
been particularly prominent—in part due to a degree of
controversy. Dediu and Ladd [25] presented evidence that
two genes related to brain structure potentially contribute
towards a cognitive bias that disfavours linguistic tone
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(the use of pitch to distinguish words) in the process of
language acquisition. Meanwhile, Lupyan and Dale [26]
demonstrated an inverse relationship between language
size (as measured number of speakers or geographical
area) and structural complexity across 28 distinct fea-
tures (e.g., the number of cases): in other words, that
more widely-spoken languages tend to be less complex.
Further clues might emerge by appealing to the dynamics
of language at a lower level of description.
3 Languages competing for speech
communities
The model of language in the previous section made ex-
plicit reference only to its structure (as defined by a set
of features). Any influence of the underlying population
of speakers was incorporated at best implicitly, for exam-
ple, by allowing the transition rates between states to de-
pend on culture-specific factors like its size (as was done in
[21]). In all of these studies, interactions between distinct
languages, other than the possibility that they share an
ancestor, were ignored. By descending a level into the hi-
erarchy, we can investigate interactions between languages
mediated by the groups of speakers using them. Note that
in order to distinguish from any other social groups (e.g.,
populations of a country) we shall use the term speech
community (borrowed from linguistics) to describe a so-
cial group with a common language.
The obvious example of an interaction between two or
more languages is where they are spoken in the same geo-
graphical area, and thereby compete for a common pool of
speakers. The Celtic languages (Welsh, Scottish and Irish
Gaelic, Cornish and Manx) that spoken alongside English
within the British Isles provide an example of such a set
[27]. The increasing dominance of English over the Celtic
languages—to the extent of extinction in the case of Cor-
nish and Marx—is evidence of competition between them
that is independent of the population dynamics in the rel-
evant regions, since neither region suffered a mass popula-
tion extinction in the relevant historical period. Rather it
is the process of language shift, whereby individual speak-
ers switch from one language to another through a variety
of mechanisms [28], that is believed to explain such de-
clines.
A seminal model of language shift was proposed by
Abrams and Strogatz [29]. It is couched in terms of the
fractions x and y = 1 − x of a population speaking two
languages X and Y respectively. The fraction of speakers
who shift from Y to X per unit time is denoted PYX and
is taken to depend on the size, x, of speech community of
X and a quantity 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 that encodes the ‘status’ of X.
The status of Y is given implicity by 1 − s, so for s > 12 ,
X has a higher status than Y. Ignoring all fluctuations,
one arrives at an ordinary differential equation for x of
the form
dx
dt
= yPYX(x, s)− xPXY(x, s) . (2)
The transition rates PYX(x, s) and PYX(x, s) are not inde-
pendent. If the size and status of a language are the only
factors that affect the competition between them, we must
obtain the same dynamics under relabelling of X and Y.
This implies that PXY(x, s) = PYX(1−x, 1−s). Under the
further mild assumptions that (i) languages with no speak-
ers are not spontaneously reinvented; (ii) that a language
with zero status is never shifted towards; and (iii) that
PY X(x, s) increases monotonically in both arguments, the
fixed points of (2) can be determined. One finds that there
are always two stable fixed points at x = 0 and x = 1, cor-
responding to extinction of X and Y respectively, and a
third fixed point that corresponds to coexistence of both
languages. This latter fixed point is always unstable, im-
plying that one of the two languages is doomed to extinc-
tion. Which of the two languages that is destined for this
fate depends on the initial condition.
Although extremely simple, this model provides a
number of valuable insights. First, Abrams and Strogatz
[29] showed that the model can be fit to time-series data
for a variety of languages. To achieve this, they chose the
form of the transition rate to be PYX(x, s) = csx
a, where
a, c and s are a set of parameters fit separately to each
linguistic time series (along with x(0)). The value of the
exponent a ≈ 1.3 was reported to be fairly robust across
the languages, although little was said about the remain-
ing parameters. Nevertheless, this appears to allow con-
fident prediction of the fate of a minority language, and
in particular the timescale over which extinction may be
expected. From a theoretical perspective, the most inter-
esting parameter in this model is s, the social status of
language X. The thinking here is that speakers have some
awareness of the opportunities afforded to them by their
choice of language, for example, to improve their own per-
sonal wealth. At this level of description, however, the pre-
cise mechanism by which this awareness is gained is left
unspecified.
The main value of Abrams and Strogatz’ model is the
limited range of outcomes it predicts under broad but rea-
sonable assumptions. In particular, the fact that coexis-
tence of two languages of different social status is impos-
sible in this framework has motivated many extensions of
the basic model, a number of which are reviewed in greater
depth elsewhere, e.g. [30,31]. There are at least two ways
in which two languages of unequal status can coexist. The
first is to assume that initially the languages are spoken in
different regions and only then mediate contact between
them by diffusion of speakers of one language into the geo-
graphical region in which the other was originally spoken
[32]. This mechanism works because Eq. (2) has stable
fixed points at x = 0 and x = 1, i.e., when either of the
two languages is the only one being spoken. This stability
implies a small incursion of speakers of the other language
can be tolerated. What is interesting about this result is
that demonstrates the possibility for a globally disfavoured
language (the one with the lower status) to survive along-
side the high-status language.
Is there any way in which two languages of different
status might coexist at the same point in space? This was
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shown to be possible if one combines the process of lan-
guage shift in the Abrams-Strogatz model with a process
of reproduction that causes both the population size to
grow and for the offspring to inherit the language of its
parents [33]. In common with many other models of pop-
ulation growth, this model featured a carrying capacity
which limits the maximum size of the population [34].
However, in [33] a separate carrying capacity was assigned
to each speech community, meaning that when the region
is saturated by speakers of language X, it can nevertheless
continue to accommodate speakers of language Y. It turns
out that it is this assumption that facilitates coexistence.
If one instead assumes that the overall size of the com-
bined population, comprising both speech communities, is
limited by a carrying capacity, which is reasonable if they
compete for the same set of resources to sustain their pop-
ulation, the possibility of coexistence is removed [35]. It
is however possible to engineer coexistence if the relative
social status of the two languages is different in differ-
ent parts of space, which could plausibly arise because
ultimately the status is a subjective judgement made by
individual speakers, and consequently different groups of
speakers could reach different judgements. Taking the re-
sults from this body of research together, it seems that
the usual outcome of language competition is for a dom-
inant language to drive others to extinction, unless there
is some spatial symmetry-breaking present, either in the
initial condition or through variation of an external fac-
tor like social status. This generalisation also applies in
the presence of noise, which can be seen from individual-
based models that incorporate the same mechanisms as
the Abrams-Strogatz model [104]. The main departure
from this generalisation is found under external interven-
tions that are explicitly designed to prevent extinction of
declining languages, such as embedding them in the school
curriculum [36].
4 Emergence of a common language
In the discussion so far, a language has been defined at
the speech community level, for example, as a set of struc-
tural features that are characteristic of the language as a
whole, and help to differentiate it from languages spoken
by different groups of people. Nevertheless, there is con-
siderable variation in the way language both between dif-
ferent members of a speech community and within the set
of utterances produced by a single individual [9,37,38]. In
common with structural variation between languages, this
variation exists at all levels of linguistic complexity: speak-
ers can differ in the way they pronounce the same word
or a syllable that appears in a class of words, in the word
they use to convey a given meaning, or in they way they
construct sentences. This variation may arise in a num-
ber of different ways [37]. For example, one property of
language is its open-endedness which confers on speakers
the ability to express propositions that they have never
articulated or heard before. This entails producing new
words or recombining words in a new way. At the same
time, speakers may adjust their set of grammatical rules,
perhaps to achieve greater internal consistency of the sys-
tem (e.g., by regularising an irregular verb). Alternatively,
words and phrases may enter one language by borrowing
from another (see, for example, the German word ansatz
that is widely used by physicists, and whose precise mean-
ing is hard to convey efficiently in English).
These innovations explain why some unconventional
forms may coexist alongside the conventional forms that
characterise a language at the speech community level.
However, these conventions also change over time, as we
have seen in Section 2. An important question relates to
the mechanism by which these innovations, which are cre-
ated in interactions between small numbers of agents, are
propagated and result in a change in a language’s macro-
scopic state. By now, this is a very well-studied problem
in statistical physics, with progress having been very com-
prehensively reviewed fairly recently [8]. It is also worth
noting that the field of sociolinguistics is devoted to un-
derstanding variability in language use, the factors that
result in one variant form being used over another, and
how these factors contribute to language change [38].
In order to discuss this large body of work in a con-
sistent fashion, we shall adopt Croft’s evolutionary frame-
work for language change initially set out in [37]. This
identifies three distinct dynamical processes that con-
tribute. The first is replication, which is the reproduction
of structures (e.g., sounds, words or a particular ordering
of word classes in a sentence). The second is innovation,
which may take the form of a completely novel utterance
or (more likely) some small change to a structure as it is
replicated (e.g., putting words in a different order in or-
der to suggest a novel meaning to the listener). The third
process is selection, which is the preferential replication
of one structure over another. Later works [39,40] intro-
duce a distinction between two types of selection: interac-
tor selection, whereby certain individual members of the
speech community have a greater influence on a speaker’s
behaviour than others, and replicator selection, whereby
one structure is systematically replicated in preference to
another by a speaker or a group of speakers.
Given pre-existing variation, replication acting with-
out any further innovation or selection taking place leads
to random changes in the frequencies of different struc-
tures that is mathematically equivalent to the process of
genetic drift [41]. We review one of the paradigmatic mod-
els of replication, the Moran model, in the next section be-
low. We then discuss how the dynamics are affected by the
addition of biases which include selection and frequency-
dependent effects. We then complete this section with a
discussion of innovation.
4.1 The Moran model of replication dynamics
For simplicity, we consider the case where some linguis-
tic structure takes one of two variant forms, A and B. As
noted previously, A and B might refer to two different pro-
nunciations of the same sound, two different words for an
object, or two different grammatical rules with the same
function (e.g., marking the past tense). Initially we shall
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Moran Utterance Selection
hii
hij
Fig. 2. The Moran and utterance selection models of replication dynamics. In the Moran model, two agents are chosen at
random from the speech community. One (shown crossed-out) has its state replaced with a copy of another (shown light shaded).
The utterance selection model is defined in terms of units of linguistic variation, rather than agents. Each speech community
now represents a memory of linguistic events. In the figure, the left-most store is that of a speaker (agent i), and the right-most
store that of a listener (agent j). A set of (here two) tokens is sampled from the speaker’s store, shown intermediate between
the two stores. With probability hii, a copy of a produced token is placed in the speaker’s store, displacing an existing memory
in the process. With probability hij , a copy is stored in the listener’s store. In the original formulation of the utterance selection
model, both agents in an interacting pair act as speakers and listeners in each interaction. The dynamics (up to a factor of two
in the characteristic timescale) is the same.
also assume that every member of the speech community
uses either A or B categorically (and not some variable
mixture of the two, although we will find that these two
cases are in fact closely related). We now define the Moran
model of replication [42] as it applies to a speech commu-
nity of N speakers with no spatial structure—see also Fig-
ure 2. In each elementary timestep, a pair of individuals
is chosen at random from the speech community to inter-
act. One of these individuals is designated as the speaker
and the other as the listener. The speaker produces an
utterance that allows the listener to identify whether the
speaker is a user of variant A or variant B. As a result
of the interaction, the listener adopts the same variant as
that used by the speaker. The Moran model thus serves
as a simple mathematical description of accommodation,
a process where interacting agents serve to align their lin-
guistic behaviour [43].
A stochastic equation of motion for this model can
be derived fairly straightforwardly [41]. First, let x be the
fraction of the N agents in the speech community who use
variant A. In order for x to change in one timestep, the
speaker-listener pair must comprise one A and one B user.
Then x increases or decreases by 1/N with equal proba-
bility. Consequently, the expected change in x is zero, and
the stochastic process is purely diffusive. The rate of dif-
fusion is obtained by examining the mean square change
in x per timestep: this is 2x(1 − x)/N2. This allows one
to write down the Fokker-Planck equation [44]
∂
∂t
P (x, t) =
1
Λ(N)
∂2
∂x2
x(1− x)P (x, t) , (3)
where P (x, t) is the probability that a fraction x of the
speech community are users of A at time t given some
initial condition, and the timescale Λ(N) = N2 for the
Moran model. Formally, this equation is exact in the limit
N →∞ under rescaling of time τ = t/Λ(N).
There are many related models of replication which
are described by (3) for an appropriate definition of the
variant frequency x and characteristic timescale Λ(N).
The earliest such model, introduced independently by
Fisher [45] and Wright [46], pre-dates the Moran model by
around 20 years, and describes changes in gene frequencies
for species where generations do not overlap. Since in this
case N replication events occur concurrently, the char-
acteristic timescale is Λ(N) = 2N (i.e., order N shorter
than in the Moran model, where replication events occur
one-by-one). When individuals are placed on the sites of
a square lattice, and speaker-listener pairs are restricted
to neighbouring sites of the lattice, we obtain the voter
model [47] (although it was not actually referred to as
such until a later work [48]). When the number of spa-
tial dimensions exceeds two, the Fokker-Planck equation
adequately describes the dynamics of the total fraction of
sites x in state A, and the characteristic timescale Λ(N)
is proportional to the number of sites. In two dimensions,
we also have (3), but where now Λ(N) is proportional to
N ln(N). On small-diameter networks, one yet again ob-
tains (3), but here the characteristic timescale Λ(N) may
scale sublinearly (or indeed superlinearly) with N depend-
ing on the network’s degree distribution and the procedure
for choosing a speaker and listener in each interaction [49–
53]. In this case, it is also necessary to replace x with a
weighted average of a variant’s frequency over the nodes
of the network. Finally, the Fokker-Planck equation (3)
also applies in the case where agents are variable users of
the variants A and B, and x gives the probability that
an agent uses variant A in an interaction; this yields the
utterance selection model [54]. In this model, the set of
N variable units comprises a memory of stored tokens of
these units (e.g., realisations of a sound, or words with a
common meaning). A speech event comprises T indepen-
dent draws from the stored memory. Both speaker and
listener may replace items in their store with copies of the
variants produced in the interaction, with different prob-
abilities depending on who produced the utterance—see
Figure 2. The feedback of a speaker’s own behaviour into
their store means that a speaker’s usage frequencies fluc-
tuate even in the absence of any listeners: in this case, one
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recovers the Moran model and (3) applies for the speaker’s
usage frequency x. In the generalisation to multiple speak-
ers, the form (3) applies at long timescales, again under
a suitable choice Λ(N) and averaging of the individual
agents’ variant frequencies to form a collective frequency
x [51,52].
Having established that the Moran model, as described
by the Fokker-Planck equation (3), can model linguistic
variation at different levels of linguistic structure within
and between speakers in different spatial geometries, we
now ask what it predicts. The equation (3) is exactly
solved for arbitrary initial condition [55], and therefore
its dynamics are very well understood. In particular it is
known that eventually one of the two variants that are ini-
tially present will go extinct in a finite time. This is rem-
iniscent of the Abrams and Strogatz’ result for language
competition, which showed that one of the competing lan-
guages is destined for extinction. Even without solving the
equation (3), it is clear that any timescale—including that
of extinction—will be proportional to Λ(N). Typically this
timescale increases with the speech community size, al-
though on highly heterogeneous social networks it can re-
main finite even in the limit of an infinite speech commu-
nity [49,51]. The relationship between fixation time and
the speech community size has proven crucial in evaluat-
ing descriptive theories of language change. For example,
it was argued that a process of accommodation—whereby
speakers seek to align their behaviour to each other in
order to be better understood [43]—was sufficient to ex-
plain the structure of new English language dialects [56].
Whilst this is true of the final state of the language that
is reached in the Moran model, the slow diffusion towards
fixation is difficult to reconcile with the rapid rate at which
such dialects are seen to form [39].
4.2 Biased replication
We now turn to the case where replication of pre-existing
variant structures is biased. We consider two paradigms,
both related to the Moran model, in which biases nat-
urally arise. The first is the utterance selection model,
defined above, in which individual speakers may exhibit
variability. The second is the iterated learning model, and
will be introduced below. In the case of the utterance se-
lection model, recall that the frequency x in the model
specifies the frequency with which a single speaker uses
variant A. As described above (see also Figure 2), utter-
ances are produced by sampling from the set of N tokens
stored in a speaker’s memory.
One way that replication may be biased is if the fre-
quency that a speaker uses a variant differs from its fre-
quency among the tokens stored in memory. For example,
a speaker may apply a bias in favour of the variant with
the highest frequency in the store (see Section 5 below
for reasons why this might be the case for real human
language behaviour). If the stored frequency is x, we can
define the production frequency f(x) as f(x) = x+αb(x),
where b(x) is the bias and α is the strength of that bias.
If we continue to work within a framework where a vari-
ant is not spontaneously re-created once it has gone ex-
tinct, this means that b(0) = b(1) = 0. Moreover, if we
assume that there is no systematic preference towards one
of the two variants (i.e., replicator selection), we must also
have b(x) = −b(1− x). The lowest order polynomial with
these properties is b(x) = x(1− x)(2x− 1). In the regime
where the bias is small, it contributes a drift term to the
Fokker-Planck equation (3) but leaves the diffusion term
unchanged. The resulting Fokker-Planck equation can be
written as a Langevin equation
x˙(t) = αb(x) +
√
x(1− x)η(t) (4)
where η(t) is a Gaussian white noise with zero mean and
variance 1/Λ(N), and the multiplicative noise is inter-
preted in the Ito sense [44,57]. The generalisation to mul-
tiple speakers on a square lattice takes the form
x˙i(t) =
∑
j
hij(xj − xi) + αb(xi) +
√
xi(1− xi)ηi(t) (5)
where xi is the frequency of variant A in speaker i’s mem-
ory, hij specifies the extent to which speaker i’s memory
is affected by the tokens produced by their neighbours j
(see Figure 2), and {ηi(t)} is a set of independent Gaus-
sian white noise terms. We can recognise the first term
as a discretised Laplacian operator, and hence this term
describes a spatial diffusion.
It turns out that there is a rather subtle interaction
between the three terms in (5). The first term seeks to
make speakers more similar to each other (in the spirit
of accommodation theory). The second and third terms
both serve to eliminate variably, either systematically (by
biasing in favour of the more frequent variant in mem-
ory) or stochastically (by sampling the tokens in the finite
memory story for production). The strength of the Gaus-
sian noise decreases as N is increased. Thus for large N ,
one expects the noise to act as a weak perturbation on
the deterministic part of the dynamics, which in turn is
closely related to the Ginzburg-Landau model of coarsen-
ing in the Ising model with non-conserved order parame-
ter. Indeed, Ising-like coarsening is observed at low noise
strengths (at least on square lattices [58]). However, for
small N , the multiplicative nature of the noise acts as a
strong perturbation on the dynamics to the extent that
it in fact changes the universal properties of the coarsen-
ing dynamics from that of the Ising model to that of the
voter model [58]. In more concrete terms, this means that
when memory is short, speakers tend to exhibit categor-
ical behaviour (because the strong noise tends to cause
extinction at the level of individual speakers), and regions
where speakers exhibit similar behaviour grow logarithmi-
cally in time. On the other hand, when memory is long,
speakers exhibit variable behaviour and regions of similar
behaviour grow as a power-law in time. It is worth noting
that one would not necessarily expect the same coarsening
behaviour to apply to every aspect of linguistic behaviour,
as the strength of the coupling between speakers, the bias
and memory lifetime may vary on a case-by-case basis.
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Based on this result, we might speculate that for
generic biases we expect there to be two regimes, one in
which the noise serves to eliminate the bias and the phe-
nomenology of the voter model is recovered, and one in
which the noise is sufficiently weak that the deterministic
limit of (5) can be used to gain insights into the fate of
variation under different types of bias. This latter regime
was investigated systematically in [40] by appealing to the
different symmetry principles the biases may have. Asym-
metry may arise separately in the coupling between speak-
ers in (5), that is when the parameters hij in (5) satisfy
hij 6= hji, or in the form of the bias function b(x), for ex-
ample by taking b(x) = x(1−x) which consistently favours
variant A. These correspond to implementing interactor
selection and replicator selection separately. It is found
that only the latter asymmetry provides a robust mecha-
nism for reproducing the widely-observed S-curve pattern
of language change, whereby the overall frequency of an
innovation in the speech community tends to track a sig-
moidal shape (such as a logistic function) as it propagates
and establishes itself as a new convention [40]. It is this
kind of bias that can transform variation at the level of
individual speakers, and translate it into a change in the
macroscopic state of the language which was the funda-
mental dynamical process modelled at the topmost level
of the hierarchy (see Section 2). However, this model of
language change remains incomplete. For the propagation
mechanism to work, the majority of speakers in the speech
community must consistently favour one of the variants
(e.g., A) over the other. Why this should be the case is
difficult to explain without more detailed understanding of
the origin and the nature of biases on linguistic behaviour,
which we discuss in more detail in Section 5 below.
Another—perhaps more fundamental—puzzle with a
model like that defined by (5) is how to achieve stabil-
ity of multiple dialects within a single speech community.
This is related to the problem of obtaining stable coexis-
tence between two languages discussed in Section 3, and
the reasons are in fact somewhat similar. Suppose that
the bias in (5) is such that for some group of neighbour-
ing individuals, the state of consensus (where all xi = 1
or all xi = 0 within this group) is stable. Then, if bi-
ases are uniform across the speech community, the state
of global consensus will be stable. On way to achieve (at
least metastable) coexistence of both variants across dif-
ferent members of the speech community is if the biases
vary from one place to another, i.e., if one subset of indi-
viduals systematically boosts the frequency of one variant
while another subset systematically boosts the frequency
of the other variant. This is analogous to one of the pro-
posed mechanisms for achieving coexistence of different
languages. However, it is problematic, because in order to
explain how behaviour (like language) that is visible to
other agents may spatially separate, we need to explain
how biases towards a specific linguistic behaviour, that
may be somewhat less visible, to other agents themselves
separate. Iterating this argument, one may arrive at an in-
finite hierarchy of increasingly obscure ‘meta-biases’, each
of which will have needed to have spatially separated in
order to permit separation at the more visible levels. Stud-
ies in the related area of opinion dynamics [8] suggest one
possible way to close this hierarchy, which is to incorpo-
rate a feedback whereby agents preferentially interact with
those agents who behave in a similar way to themselves.
Separation into groups that exhibit their own distinctive
behaviour is seen in three classes of model that implement
this idea, namely Brownian agents that diffuse towards
regions of similar opinion [59], Deffuant-type models of
bounded confidence [60] where agents whose opinions dif-
fer by more than a certain amount have no effect on each
other and the Axelrod model [61] and derivatives where
agents exhibit multiple variable traits and the probability
a pair of agents interacts depends on how many traits they
have in common. In the language of Croft el al [37,39,40],
this corresponds to a feedback between two type different
types of selection they identified, namely replicator and
interactor selection.
We now turn to the second paradigmatic class of mod-
els that relate to the Moran model of replication: the iter-
ated learning model. These have mainly been researched
within the linguistics community: see [62,63] for reviews
from that perspective. Each individual in a group of agents
is characterised in terms of a grammar—a set of rules that
governs their linguistic productions. Where there are two
possible grammars, we can denote them A and B, as in the
Moran model defined above in Section 4.1. The dynamics
of the iterated learning model are usually formulated as
follows. A na¨ıve agent is exposed to the utterances gener-
ated by an experienced agent’s grammar. The task of this
na¨ıve agent is to infer a suitable grammar (A or B in the
case of two grammars), at which point they become an ex-
perienced agent. This agent may then serve as a model for
one (or more) na¨ıve agents to learn from. We can think of
this as a replication process, in that grammars are repli-
cated from one generation to the next: however, changes
may occur in replication due to the fact that more than
one grammar may be compatible with the set of utterances
that the learner was exposed to. Biases may be present in
production or learning that result in certain grammars
being favoured over others as they are replicated: these
thus mirror the biases discussed above in the context of
language use and the utterance selection model. Indeed,
a more formal connection between the iterated learning
model and the utterance selection model was made in the
case where a grammar specifies the frequency with which
two variant forms should be used. Here it was shown that if
agents employ a Bayesian learning algorithm after hearing
N tokens of a variable structure, the estimated frequency
x is governed by the Langevin equation (4) with a bias
that can act either in favour or against categorical use of
a single variant, depending on the prior expectations of
the language learner and the number of tokens heard [64].
The main purpose of iterated learning models is to
understand processes by which an initially unstructured
language may acquire structure after many generations
of learning. Of particular interest are properties that are
thought to transcend all languages. These design features
[65] include the fact language is productive (i.e., the ability
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to articulate a novel thought and be understood by a lis-
tener) and compositional (i.e., that the meaning of an ut-
terance can be understood from the meanings of the com-
ponent parts). It seems likely that these two features are
related: for example, compositionality provides a means
by which language can be productive. What is less obvi-
ous is that a pressure on speakers to be productive can
promote the emergence of compositional structure.
This effect was demonstrated within an iterated learn-
ing model with the space of grammars defined in such a
way that agents could express a set of structured meanings
(e.g., objects that have a shape and a colour) in either a
holistic way (i.e., with no relation between the structure
of the signal and meaning) or a compositional way (where
the component parts of the meaning can be understood
from the component parts of the signal) [66]. The bias
responsible for the emergence of structure lies in the pro-
duction part of the interaction. The experienced agents
have no control over which meanings they are required
to express when providing training data to na¨ıve agents:
thus if the amount of data that is presented at each gen-
eration is small, agents may be confronted with meanings
for which they have never heard a signal. Under these
conditions, it is found that grammars that allow compo-
nents of signals to be recombined are favoured by iterated
learning. In more abstract terms, one might think of this
as a competition between minimising the number of dis-
tinct signals in the grammar and maximising the ability
to convey arbitrarily complex meanings. Such a competi-
tion may perhaps be related to guiding principles, such as
the principle of least effort [67] and the principle of uni-
form information density [68], which could potentially be
investigated within this modelling framework.
4.3 Innovation
The modelling of replication dynamics is greatly simpli-
fied if one knows in advance all possible variants of linguis-
tic structure that may come into existence as the system
evolves. Then, the state space is of fixed dimension, and
one can (for example) extend the Moran model and its
relatives to a larger number variants. Indeed, the multi-
variant generalisation of (3) is exactly solvable if the rate
at which an agent spontaneously innovates a given variant
Ai is independent of the state of the system [69]. Techni-
cally, this is because there is no current in the steady state:
at some level, the dynamics is in the same class as that for
physical systems at thermal equilibrium. All other mod-
els of innovation generate non-equilibrium steady states,
and we are not aware of any exact solutions for the multi-
variant Moran model in this case.
The situation is even more complex when arbitrarily
many variants can be created, as is the case for language,
given its design feature of productivity. For the case where
replication of existing variants is unbiased, and where new
variants (each of which has never been seen before) are
innovated at a constant rate, one arrives at the infinite-
alleles model in population genetics for which some ex-
act results are available [70,71]. A more straightforward
approach—and one that allows easier connection to hu-
man behaviour—is Monte Carlo simulation. A large body
of such work centres on the problem of a speech commu-
nity reaching consensus on a name for a novel object. Here
the paradigmatic model is the naming game [72], in which
agents each maintain a lexicon of words that they recog-
nise as a possible label for an object. Initially, this lexicon
is empty for all agents. The dynamics proceeds by repeat-
edly choosing a speaker-listener pair at random from the
speech community. The speaker presents a name for the
object to the listener: in the case where the speaker’s lex-
icon is empty, a completely new name is invented on the
spot; otherwise the speaker chooses a name at random
from their existing lexicon. If the listener also has this
name in their lexicon, the interaction is deemed a success,
and both speaker and listener delete all other names (if
any) from their lexica. Otherwise the interaction is a fail-
ure, and the listener adds the name uttered by the speaker
to their lexicon. At the level of the speech community,
the dynamics proceeds in three stages: initially, interac-
tions typically require the invention of a new name, and
so the total number of different names grows in time. In
the second stage, these names spread across multiple lex-
ica, thereby increasing the chance that both speaker and
listener will have a common name for the object. This pre-
cipitates the final stage of the dynamics where consensus
on a single name for the object is achieved across the entire
speech community. The timescale on which this consensus
is reached is found from simulation to be Λ(N) ∼ N3/2,
which is faster than the diffusive process of fixation in the
Moran model. Moreover, on this timescale, the transition
to the state of consensus becomes sharper (suggestive of
something like a first-order dynamical phase transition).
The origin of the short timescale for consensus formation
relative to the Moran model can be understood by con-
sidering just the late-time regime where only two names
remain and a direct comparison is possible [73,74]. Here
one finds two distinct biases serve to favour the variant
that is in the majority in the speech community. First,
when communication is a success, the listener’s deletion
of alternative names from their lexicon in itself favours
the majority variant. Second, the listener feeds back to
the speaker that communication was a success, and the
speaker also applies the deletion step, further boosting the
majority variant. Consequently, one would expect similar
dynamics even without the explicit feedback step that is
included in the original naming game dynamics.
From an empirical perspective, the most interesting
application of a model of this type is to understand uni-
versal properties of colour terms. Languages differ in the
number of basic colour terms (like ‘red’ or ‘green’ in En-
glish) that exist, and also in the shades that are regarded
prototypical of a specific colour term [75]. Nevertheless,
the division of the continuous colour space into discrete
categories is not completely arbitrary: in particular, the
prototypes for each category (eg red, blue and green) form
clusters in colour space that do not strongly overlap [75,
76]. Baronchelli et al [77] used an extension to the naming
game to explain this phenomenon. The basic idea is that
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speakers are presented with multiple colours in a single
scene, and seek to refer to a specific target colour. If the
speaker’s categorisation of the (one-dimensional) colour
space is such that the target is the sole member of its cat-
egory in the scene, a word associated with this category is
presented to the listener. Otherwise, the speaker creates
a new category (and a new word for it) that is sufficient
to disambiguate the target from the other colours present.
The interaction is successful if the listener recognises the
word, and manages to correctly infer the target meaning
(either because it is unambiguous according to the lis-
tener’s categorisation, or because they guessed correctly
among equally plausible alternatives). Addition and dele-
tion of words than proceeds as in the naming game: in the
case of failed communication, the speaker indicates the
target meaning and the listener adds the uttered word to
the category containing that meaning. Na¨ıvely one might
expect these dynamics to lead to a very fine partitioning
of colour space so that any combination of stimuli can
be disambiguated. However, this is not the case for two
reasons. First, only a small number of colours are typi-
cally shown in a scene, so the distance between them will
typically be large. Second, speakers and listeners need to
have well-aligned category boundaries for communication
to be successful. Such alignment is hard to achieve with
a large number of boundaries, and the failed interactions
will tend to lead to words spreading between categories.
Consequently, there is a trade-off between the ability to
express distinctions between different colours and the dif-
ficulty of aligning a highly complex category system, rem-
iniscent of the trade-offs seen in iterated learning mod-
els discussed above. The question of how category pro-
totypes (which can be defined as the midpoint between
two category boundaries) cluster around universal points
was investigated by incorporating the psychological no-
tion of a just noticeable difference (JND) into the model.
In the context of colour, these means that any two stim-
uli presented in the same scene different in wavelength
by some small value. Empirical research shows that the
JND varies with wavelength: some nearby colours are eas-
ier for humans in all cultures to distinguish than others
[78]. Consequently, this breaks the translational symmetry
in colour space, and generates clustering that is argued to
be consistent with that found empirically [77].
5 Individual linguistic interactions
In all the models of consensus formation and related pro-
cesses discussed in the previous section, it is only the
last [77] that made explicit use of empirically-determined
quantitative data for individual human behaviour. Fur-
ther opportunities to align models more closer to such
data may arise from a considerable growth in experimen-
tal research on human communicative and linguistic in-
teractions over the past few years (see [79] for a recent re-
view). In addition to providing data relevant to language
modelling, these experiments also illustrate some of the
considerable complexity that is evident in human commu-
nication.
First, it is worth considering how a communicative act
would appear to alien with limited communicative capabil-
ities (or perhaps a domestic cat). What they would observe
is people using their lungs and mouths to create pressure
waves in the air, perhaps also moving their arms around
at the same time, along with other movements like blink-
ing, scratching of heads and so on. What would it take
for the alien to realise that these actions have a commu-
nicative intent? This question has been addressed through
experiments involving robots [80] and humans [81] that
demonstrate processes by which communication channels
are created on-the-fly through interactions without pre-
specifying that communication is desirable or providing an
obvious way to do so. In the case of humans, the crucial
step that the agents make is to perform behaviour that
is unexpected from other agents’ perspectives. This al-
lows these agents to infer that the behaviour may be com-
municative [81]. This process requires complex cognitive
abilities—for example the ability to predict how another
agent will respond to an action—and as such is argued to
be specific to humans [82].
Given this understanding of how agents are able to
identify certain behaviours as potential signals, the ques-
tion now arises as to how they would associate a signal
with a specific meaning. Here it is worth remarking that in
almost all models discussed above in Section 4, the mean-
ing of a signal was always assumed to be known to both
agents in a communicative interaction. For example, in
the case of the colour terms study [77], any ambiguity in
the meaning of a word was always resolved after an inter-
action as the speaker “unveils the topic [target meaning]
via pointing” [77, SI:p2]. If it is always possible to com-
municate a word’s meaning by nonlinguistic means, then
language is surely redundant. This suggests that there is
likely always to be some some ambiguity in any utter-
ance, particularly in the process of language acquisition
where children somehow infer the meanings of words (and
more generally grammatical constructions) from experi-
enced language users.
There is a considerable body of experimental research
that addresses this problem (see e.g. [83] for a review
of early contributions in this area). Much of this work
is conducted in an artificial language learning paradigm,
whereby experimental participants are presented with a
series of scenes containing a number of potential referents
of a word (or set of words) and are asked questions that de-
termine the inferences that participants have drawn about
the meanings of words they have heard. The working hy-
pothesis that has emerged is that a number of processes
combine to deliver reliable word learning. First, on hear-
ing an unfamiliar word, learners apply various heuristics
to narrow down the (potentially infinite) set of possi-
ble meanings to a more manageable number of candidate
meanings [83]. Experimentally attested heuristics include
following the gaze of the speaker [84], an expectation that
a word is more likely to relate to a whole object rather
than one of its parts [85], or that no two words have the
same meaning [86]. In some cases, these heuristics are able
to eliminate all uncertainty and the word is learnt immedi-
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ately. This effect is known as fast mapping [87]. However,
it seems plausible that this is not always possible, and that
language learners integrate information from multiple ex-
posures to resolve any ambiguity. For example, if a child
first encounters the word “sheep” on a visit to a farm,
they could assume from the context that this refers to a
cow that is also physically present; it is only on a later en-
counter that the cow meaning is implausible, whereas the
sheep meaning is highly plausible, and the child revises
their internal lexicon accordingly.
The general practice of combining information from
multiple exposures is referred to as cross-situational learn-
ing [88], and the separate process of hypothesising a (pos-
sibly incorrect) meaning and awaiting confirmation from
later exposures is referred to variably as a guess-and-test
[89] or propose-and-verify [90] heuristic. Both processes—
along with a variety of others—been observed in arti-
ficial language learning experiments, which have been
conducted variously with children and adults [89,91,90].
These results have inspired mathematical models of word
learning which show that a lexicon of the size of that typ-
ically acquired by an adult human (60,000 words [83]) can
be learnt on a realistic timescale under quite general con-
ditions [92,93]. It is even in principle possible to learn
the meaning of a word when an infinite set of alternative
meanings can be inferred at any given exposure, as long
as a learner can assign a plausibility ranking in such a way
that the kth most plausible meaning decays as a power-law
k−σ with some positive exponent σ [94]. The main chal-
lenge faced by a cross-situational learner is when a non-
target meaning of a word is almost always as plausible as
the target meaning. In this situation, the much-discussed
mutual exclusivity constraint [86], whereby no two words
are expected to have a common meaning, can greatly fa-
cilitate the process of identifying the correct meaning (as
long as the plausible but incorrect meaning has an associ-
ated word) [95].
A small but significant (and somewhat ingenious) ex-
tension to the artificial language learning paradigm al-
lows the emergence of structure that was previously seen
in computational implementations of the iterated learning
model (see Section 4.2) to be replicated with real human
participants. The idea is that the first participant learns a
language that exhibits no systematic structure: for exam-
ple, a random combination of syllables for a set of objects
that occupy a structured meaning space (e.g., have var-
ious shape and colour combinations). After training, the
participant is asked to name a set of objects (some of
which they may not have seen before). The twist is that
the answers that are provided in testing are then used as
the training data for the next participant. This process
can then be iterated to see how the language evolves as
a consequence of repeated learning and production. The
first experiment of this type [96] confirmed the predic-
tions of the earlier computer simulations [66], namely that
the communication system acquires a systematic composi-
tional structure over multiple generations of learning. This
experiment further provides evidence for a competition
between maximising the number of distinctions between
meanings and minimising the complexity of the language
that was alluded to above. This was seen by comparing two
conditions, one in which participants could be exposed to
a language where the same signal had multiple meanings,
and one in which a filter was installed to prevent this from
occuring. If the former case, the language became simpler
by becoming less expressive; in the latter, the language
retained its expressivity by becoming more structured.
Variations on this experimental approach have been
used to explore other topics that were discussed in Sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3, in particular the role that biases may
play in changing the way in which the frequency of differ-
ent variants change over time. One set of experiments cen-
tres around a graphical communication task reminiscent of
the game Pictionary [97]. Here, participants are provided
with a predefined set of meanings and are asked to draw
a picture to communicate one of them to another partic-
ipant who has to identify the correct meaning. The set
of meanings is deliberately constructed to contain items
that are hard to differentiate graphically (e.g., ‘drama’ and
‘soap opera’). In one such experiment [97], pairs of par-
ticipants work through the set of meanings, thereby con-
structing their own individual symbols for the means. The
participants are then grouped into new pairs, and asked to
communicate the same set of meanings. This experiment
thus mirrors the naming game (see Section 4.3 and [72]).
A key question is what happens when two players who
have established different symbols for the same meaning
meet. Tamariz et al [98] consider two biases that might af-
fect whether a participant keeps their existing symbol or
switches to the other player’s symbol after an interaction.
The first is a coordination bias, which is a bias towards or
against adopting symbols produced by other players. The
second is a content bias, which is a bias towards specific
symbols (e.g., because they communicated the intended
meaning more effectively than others). These two biases
are instances of interactor and replicator selection in the
language of [39,40]. The main findings were that players
tended to be biased in favour of keeping their existing sig-
nals, but that evidence of content bias was present in most
cases. It is interesting to note that these two effects are
in conflict with each other: content bias promotes change,
but agents are generally resistant to modifying their be-
haviour.
In the graphical communication experiment, agents are
well characterised by usage of one particular signals for a
given meaning. Since language users can be variable in
language use, it is of interest to learn what happens to
this variability when these users interact. In particular,
this may provide some information as to the appropriate
bias to include in an equation Eq. (4) which models vari-
able language behaviour. Again, iterated learning experi-
ments can be applied to this problem. Reali and Griffiths
[99] set up a language where each object has two names
which appear with prescribed frequencies against their
target meaning. After training, a participant is asked to
name each object several times, which provides a set of fre-
quencies to use for the next generation of learning. In this
approach, one can build up a transition matrix T (x′|x),
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which gives the probability that when word A is used with
frequency x to name an object, that after learning an in-
dividual uses that word with frequency x′. Reali and Grif-
fiths find that in one generation of learning, learners ap-
pear to probability match, i.e., that x¯′ =
∑
x′ T (x
′|x) ≈ x.
However, considerable variation is evident, and over multi-
ple generations of learning the frequency distribution that
results is consistent with a weak bias against variability
(i.e., one that favours frequencies close to 0 or 1). This
is consistent with sociolinguistic understanding of varia-
tion, which is that where variation exists, it is usually
conditioned on a linguistic factor (e.g., the pronunciation
of a sound may depend on the position in the word) or
a social factor (e.g., the speaker’s age, level of education
or other aspect of their identity) [9,38]. A further iter-
ated learning experiment [100] bears this out, wherein the
initial language had consistent names for each of the ob-
jects, but two different plural markers. Although initially
one plural marker is more frequent than the other, there
is no correlation between which plural marking is used for
which object. Here it is found that iterated learning either
eliminates one of the plural markers, or that the variation
becomes predictable: that is, each object is typically plu-
ralised by one or other of the markers, but not both.
A final application of the artificial language learning
paradigm is to investigate whether the non-uniform distri-
bution of a structural feature over the world’s languages
(like word order, see Section 2) predicts the existence of
a bias towards the more frequent structures in single in-
stances of learning. One such study relates to affixes that
change the meaning of the word. Where this occurs, it
turns out that suffixes are more common than prefixes or
infixes [101]. To investigate whether this is also true at
the individual level, St Clair et al [102] trained partici-
pants on an artificial language in which words are divided
into two categories, each with their own affix. When pre-
sented with unfamiliar sentences, participants could more
reliably identify when the correct affix was used for a par-
ticular word stem, in correspondence with the observation
that suffixes are more common than prefixes.
As noted in Section 2, correlations between two struc-
tural features of a language have been observed, and are
formulated as implicational universals. Culbertson et al
[103] set up an experiment to determine whether a corre-
lation between the order of numerals and nouns and the
order of adjectives and nouns is visible at the level of indi-
vidual learning events. In particular, one of the four pos-
sible orderings is much less frequent than the other three.
Participants were trained on four variant languages, and
then asked to describe a set of scenes using the language
they had learnt. Points were awarded for a valid descrip-
tion of the scene (i.e., the right words, but in any order)
and additionally if the order matched that of a computer-
generated ‘native’ speaker of the artificial language. The
input languages were set up in such a way that partici-
pants would score maximum points by using one of the
four possible orderings exclusively. The results of this ex-
periment showed that this happened for all four input lan-
guages, apart from the one that corresponds to the order-
Unit of variation Locus of enquiry
Language a shared system Phylogenetic relationships
between languages
Speech community associ-
ated with a language
Language competition,
death and coexistence
Individuals within a speech
community
Emergence of shared
conventions and mainte-
nance of variation between
subcommunities
Episodes of acquisition and
production
Biases that favour one lin-
guistic variant over an-
other
Table 1. Hierarchy of scales in language dynamics covered in
this article ordered by decreasing length- and timescales
ing that is rare across the world’s languages. Again, this
suggests that the non-uniform distribution over structures
in the worlds’ languages originates in biases that act at the
level of single instances of language acquisition or use.
6 Unifying the hierarchy
In this short Colloquium I have surveyed four levels in
a hierarchy of scales that are relevant to language dy-
namics. Each level can be classified according to the main
unit of variation at that level. This then determines the
range of phenomena that are available for investigation:
see Table 1. Here, we have taken individual episodes of
language acquisition and production to sit at the base
of the hierarchy. These episodes typically involve a small
number of language users (often just two) interacting for
a short period of time (typically minutes). These length-
and timescales are sufficiently small that laboratory exper-
iments involving human participants—and the full com-
plexity of their cognitive apparatus—can be used to mea-
sure biases that govern how language learning and produc-
tion affects the structure and variability of language (see
Section 5). In principle, we could descend to a deeper level,
where we take the structure of the internal cognitive ap-
paratus as the unit of variation, but we have left this aside
here in the interests of brevity. With knowledge of these
biases, we can then build effective models of individual hu-
man behaviour, and embed these individuals in a speech
community, as described in Section 4. Through repeated
interactions, language structure may emerge, and one that
can characterise an entire speech community. At higher
levels of the hierarchy, both speech communities and lan-
guages are taken as coherent units. In the former case this
leads to competition between languages, as described in
Section 3, and in the latter, languages differentiate over
time giving rise to a tree-like structure of relationships
between them.
In principle, one could integrate the different levels of
the hierarchy into a single whole, and the discussion we
have given provides some detail as to how this might be
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achieved in practice. First, from the experiments described
in Section 5, we described how one can build up a transi-
tion matrix T (x′|x) that specifies how individuals modify
the frequency x that they exhibit a specific behaviour in
single interactions. This transition rate matrix could then
be incorporated into the update rules of a Moran-type
model (Section 4.1), which would lead to a set of stochas-
tic equations of motion analogous to Eq. (5), where the
biases b(x) that can be traced back to the experimentally-
determined transition matrix T (x′|x). From here, one can
predict the structures that become established as conven-
tions in a speech community, and by further augmenting
individuals in the model with their own birth-death dy-
namics we can study the competition between languages
with different structures that occurs at the level of the
speech community (Section 3). If one coarse-grains over
individual variability and looks for a deterministic limit,
it seems likely that a description similar to that postulated
by Abrams and Strogatz, Eq. (2), will result. If one further
coarse-grains over the number of speakers, and looks at the
conventions that are formed over longer timescales, then
an effective dynamics for changes in these structures—for
example, the Poisson process (1) that has been used in
the phylogenetic analyses of Section 2—would result.
Although it is technically possible to connect the levels
of the hierarchy in this way, is there any intellectual value
in doing so? After all, when studying the relationships
that emerge between languages at the largest length- and
timescales, one may not be too interested in the precise
process by which a new convention becomes established,
just how this may be adequately described at the relevant
timescales. A Poisson process could provide the adequacy
that is desired. However, in addressing this question it is
worth looking more deeply into the some of the underlying
motivations for research questions that have been posed at
opposite ends of the hierarchy. For example, in their study
of word-order universals at the level of entire languages,
Maurits and Griffiths [24] make reference to underlying
psychological biases that act in favour of one word order
(e.g., burdens on working memory) and how one would
then expect these to be reflected in a preferred direction of
change at the macroscopic level. Meanwhile, Culbertson et
al [103] in their experimental study of changes in word or-
der that occur at the level of an individual refer to the hy-
pothesis that “if a logically-possible grammatical system
is not found, or is quite rate cross-linguistically, the ex-
planation offered by [theories based on biases in learning]
is that this system violates a learning bias” [103, p306]. It
is reassuring that the results of both investigations point
in a similar direction, in that less common word orders
appear to be less stable both at the level of individual
learning and at the level of historical change. However,
to demonstrate that these are manifestations of the same
phenomenon requires us to connect the two descriptions
via the intermediate levels of the hierarchy.
Two sources of complexity make such a demonstra-
tion challenging. First, many factors can affect language
dynamics at each level of the hierarchy. By way of illus-
tration, suppose that transmission matrices between lin-
guistic states for single individuals have been established
in an experimental setting, and are understood to char-
acterise all human beings. On plugging these into speech-
community-level models, it is clear from (4) that changes
in state at the level of the common language that emerges
can depend on specific (non-linguistic) features of those
communities. For example, the characteristic timescale in
the Moran model, the function Λ(N) in Eq. (3), can vary
with the speech community size N in a way that depends
on how the social network is connected, and the relative
influence that different speakers can have on each other.
At the same time, the propagation of a minority variant
seems to require a positive disposition (replicator selection
bias) towards it on the part of a majority of speakers. Such
disposition towards a particular way of speaking presum-
ably varies from one speech community to another and
within a single community over time, for example due to
its association with a particular well-regarded group of in-
dividuals [37]. Thus it would in fact be somewhat surpris-
ing if the transition rates that apply at the macroscopic
level, as in Eq. (1), were universal for a given structural
feature in space and time, unless perhaps all the changes
that occur at the lower levels of the hierarchy on such
a fast timescale that they give the appearance of being
so. Indeed, some studies [26,23,21] provide evidence that
language structure and the rate of language change co-
vary with culture-specific factors. The second source of
complexity is one that we have barely touched on in this
work, namely that human language is a highly complex
object, with many different components (sounds, words,
grammar), which presumably interact with each other in
acquisition and use. Almost all studies of language dynam-
ics have considered a small number of variable units evolv-
ing in isolation from the rest of the linguistic system. It
is not obvious whether such a simplification is reasonable,
or whether some vital part of the description is missing.
To resolve these open questions, simultaneous progress
is needed on at least three fronts. First, a more complete
mathematical understanding of what specific models pre-
dict would be valuable. For example, the exact solutions
of the simplest Moran models and their variants have pro-
vided a great deal of insight into evolutionary dynamics in
general [70]; however, these solutions are known only for
the case where currents vanish in the steady state. Thus,
as in physics, the more general case of athermal (entropy-
producing) dynamics is the one that is both of greater
applicability, but presents a correspondingly more diffi-
cult mathematical challenge. Meanwhile, more complex
dynamical processes are typically implemented as compu-
tational models. Again, it is typically difficult to access
realistic degrees of complexity (e.g., in speech community
size, or structure of the linguistic system) in cases where
the stationary state is not an equilibrium (zero-current)
case, as the most efficient simulation algorithms tend to
rely on this property.
Second, as this and other reviews (e.g., [8,63]) attest,
there is a profusion of models of language dynamics (and
related processes like opinion formation). At the same
time, many distinct models show broadly similar results,
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for example, a tendency towards consensus unless there
is a pre-existing spatial symmetry breaking or a feedback
between agent behaviour and the propensity to interact;
or that structure tends to emerge over repeated learning.
The statistical physics community in particular is yet to
converge on a core set of models that achieve the optimal
balance between (analytical or computational) tractabil-
ity and explanatory power. It is also important to con-
solidate the various modelling approaches that have been
taken into a set of general principles. A number of works
hint for example at principles that involve trade-offs be-
tween the expressive power and complexity of a language
system, which are broadly reminiscent of the trade-offs
between energy and entropy that provide a deep under-
standing of collective phenomena in physical systems.
Finally, it is a truth almost universally acknowledged
that data for historical language behaviour is scarce. Al-
though the World Atlas of Language Structures [13] is
extensive in terms of the number of languages and struc-
tures that it covers, it does so at only one point in time.
This allows historical changes to be inferred, but validat-
ing these inferences by comparing with the actual changes
that have occurred is difficult. These difficulties are further
confounded if it turns out that additional factors (such as
the speech community size or social network structure)
also affect historical language dynamics, since then these
will need to be known as well. However, there may be ap-
proaches that will allow these gaps in the empirical data
to be bridged. First, if one is specifically interested in
how linguistic behaviour spreads and changes over short
timescales, social media may provide a rich resource. In
particular, it may be possible to determine whether mod-
els of the type described in Section 4 adequately describe
how innovations propagate through an online community.
Other large-scale sources of data with greater time depth
also exist, such as Google’s corpus of scanned books [105].
Alongside providing snapshots of language use, the online
world also offers the opportunity for mass behavioural ex-
periments. Many of experimental designs outlined in Sec-
tion 5 lend themselves to being set as tasks on platforms
like the Amazon Mechancical Turk, and their results have
been found to correlate well with traditional experiments
(see e.g. [106]). Scientific progress is greatly accelerated
when data is abundant, and with some creative thinking,
data-driven advances in language modelling may pave the
way to a more complete understanding of processes that
lie beyond the grasp of empirical research.
I think Bill Croft for introducing me to this fascinating topic,
and Simon Kirby, Andrew Smith and Kenny Smith for their
ability to explain linguistics in a way that a physicist can un-
derstand.
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